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STATE OF UTAH 
RANDALL FRANK MARK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
TAMRA JEAN HANCOCK MARK, 
and JANIS PECK HANCOCK, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action between natural parents of a minor 
child to determine permanent cusitory of the child. The 
parties obtained a divorce in the State of Alabama where 
the Court temporarily deprived both parties of custody 
on the ground of immaturity and awarded temporary 
custody of the child to the Defendant's step-mother. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment 
in favor of the Defendant, the Plaintiff appeals. 
Case No. 
13733 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were residents of the State of Utah and 
were married in this State. The parties moved to Ala-
bama because of the Plaintiff's enlistment in the United 
States Air Force. While in Alabama, Defendant initiated 
proceedings for divorce and a Decree of Divorce was issued 
in favor of the Defendant. The minor child of the parties 
was temporarily placed in the custody of the Defendant's 
step-mother who resided in Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
visitation privileges were granted both the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant. The Alabama Court held that both par-
ties were immature and directed that action for perma-
nent custody be initiated in the State of Utah (R-37, 38). 
Plaintiff initiated an action for permanent custody of 
the minor child on the 19th day of December, 1973. The 
named Defendants in that action were the Defendant, 
Tamra Mark, natural mother of the minor child, and Janis 
Peck Hancock step-mother of the Defendant Tamra Mark. 
Janis Peck Hancock defaulted in answering the Plaintiff's 
complaint and on the 25th day of January 1974, her de-
fault was entered (R-26). 
The case was tried to the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, District Judge, on the 29th day of April, 1974. 
Prior to the hearing, the Plaintiff moved the Court for 
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an order to compel a pre-hearing evaluation of both par-
ties but the motion was contested by the Defendant and 
the Court denied the motion for the pre-hearing evalua-
tion (R-ll, 20). 
The trial was tried on the 29th and 30th of April 
1974 and on May 1, 1974 the Court entered its Memoran-
dum Decision, holding that the Defendant and natural 
mother of the minor child was a "fit and proper person 
to be awarded permanent care, custody, and control of 
said minor child" (R-14). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRE-HEARING 
CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATION OF THE 
PARTIES. 
The Plaintiff, on April 2, 1974 moved the Court for 
an order directing the Plaintiff and Defendant to submit 
necessary information for a child custody evaluation to 
be conducted by the Salt Lake Mental Health Division. 
Although no written objections were filed by the Defen-
dant, counsel for the Defendant appeared at the time of 
hearing and objected to the child custody evaluation on 
the grounds that such evaluation would be a violation of 
the Defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. Under Section 30-3-17 
and 30-3-17.1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
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the Utah Legislature granted the District Courts author-
ity to require either or both spouses to appear before 
counselors, physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, social 
workers, or other specialists and granted such experts the 
right to submit written evaluations of the prospects or 
prognosis without devulging facts or revealing confiden-
tial disclosures. Certainly these statutory provisions in-
dicate the Legislature was cognizant of the parties' consti-
tutional rights and these provisions do not violate these 
rights in any way. The requested evaluation is hardly 
distinguishable from the present adoption evaluations re-
quired in adoption proceedings in the State of Utah. 
The Defendant may argue that the consent of both 
parties is required for the evaluation to be conducted 
pursuant to Section 30-3-15.2 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
as amended. However, that provision does not dictate 
a joint agreement between parties before an investigation 
can be ordered by the Court. The Section merely states 
that a written report may be introduced in evidence when 
both parties consent to it in writing. Obviously if a party 
objects to the written report being submitted as evidence, 
the Court is then empowered to proceed under Section 
30-3-17.1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 to receive a written 
evaluation of the prospects and prognosis without receiv-
ing specific facts or without violating confidential dis-
closures. (Emphasis added.) 
Moreover, it seems inconsistent for the Defendant 
to object to an evaluation or to an investigation of at 
least the immediate environment in which the minor child 
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is proposed to be placed when she is then permitted to 
come to Court and testify to the adequacy or excellence 
of the environment in which she proposes to place the 
child. This situation in analogous to cases where a party 
in a civil action claims a privilege under the Fifth Amend-
ment and attempts to frustrate the due process of the 
law. Argument on this point will be made under Point 
II of Plaintiff's Brief. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A 
FINDING THAT THE BEST INTEREST OF 
THE MINOR CHILD IS BETTER SERVED 
BY AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR 
CHILD TO THE DEFENDANT AND NAT-
URAL MOTHER. 
The Defendant throughout the entire trial contended 
that the Plaintiff's burden was to show that the Defen-
dant, natural mother, was unfit, immoral, or incompetent 
before the presumption in favor of the mother was over-
come. All of the recent cases decided by this Court con-
sistently hold that the controlling consideration in cases 
such as this is the "best interests of the child". This posi-
tion is most clearly illustrated in Hyde vs. Hyde, 22 U. 
2d 429, 454 P. 2d 884 (1969). The Court, in affirming the 
lower Court's award of custody to the father, indicated 
that the welfare of the child was the paramount considera-
tion under Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
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The Court quoted Steiger vs. Steiger, 4 U. 2d 273, 293 P. 
2d 418 (1956) and stated: 
"The divorced mother has no absolute right 
to custody b u t . . . the policy of our decisions has 
been to give weight to the view that all things 
being equal, preference should be given to the 
mother in awarding custody of a child of tender 
years . . ." 
The Court further stated: 
"The Defendant has no absolute right to 
custody . . . because she is the mother. At best 
she is in an advantaged position when all things 
are equal. However, when things are not equal 
as regards the ability of the parties to care for 
and properly rear the child, then any advantage 
customarily given to the mother must be denied, 
and the award made so as to provide for the best 
interest and welfare for the child." 
It is obvious that the decisions today look beyond 
the maternal presumption regardless of the tender years 
of the child. The proposed permanent home of the child, 
the child's physical, emotional, educational, psychological, 
and financial needs are to be considered all with the view 
towards determining what best serves the child and ob-
viously differs from past decisions which refer to the 
rights of the parents as compared to the rights of the 
child in question. In Stocks vs. Stocks, 14 U. 2d 314, 383 
P. 2d 923 (1963) the Court stated: 
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"The rule which favors the mother is only 
one of many factors which must be considered 
and is applicable only if all things are equal. . ." 
"The instant case is a good example of the 
undesirable and impractical results that would 
emanate from adopting the view urged by Plain-
tiff that the Court must invariably, in all circum-
stances, award the custody of children under 10 
to the mother unless she is found to be an im-
moral or incompetent person." 
As indicated, the Defendant's position throughout 
the entire trial presumed that the Court must find that 
the Defendant was unfit or immoral or incompetent be-
fore the Plaintiff, the natural father, could prevail in the 
action. The Memorandum Decision also suggests that 
perhaps the natural mother would have to be shown to 
be unfit before the natural father could prevail. The pre-
cise wording of the Memorandum Decision states: 
"In this matter the Court finds that the De-
fendant as mother of the minor child is a fit and 
proper person to be awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of said minor child" (R-14). 
Plaintiff proceeded on the theory that the best in-
terest of the child would better be served by the total 
circumstances which the Plaintiff could provide as com-
pared to that which the Defendant could provide. The 
evidence at the trial showed that the Plaintiff was a 
veteran, having obtained an honorable, hardship discharge 
from the United States Air Force upon recommendation 
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of the Court in Selma, Alabama (R-37). The Plaintiff 
is presently enrolled at Weber State College majoring in 
Police Science with a minor in Psychology and is an A 
student. He presently resides with his parents in Salt 
Lake City and the parents have consented to providing 
him with the facilities with which to raise the minor child 
and to provide the necessary care and supervision for the 
child during Plaintiff's attendance at college or whenever 
he was unable to be with the minor child. The testimony 
further indicates that the child's room had been recently 
remodeled to accommodate the child and that the yard is 
completely fenced to insure the safety of the child (3P. 
thru 9P.). The neighborhood provides adequate playmates 
for the child. The medical needs of the child, since his ar-
rival here in Salt Lake City has been provided primarily by 
the Plaintiff or the paternal grandparents of the minor 
child. The actual custody of the minor child has been pri-
marily with the Plaintiff or the paternal grandparents of 
the minor child as indicated by the records kept by Plain-
tiff and the paternal grandparents (Exhibit 14P. and 
15P.). The paternal grandmother is a housewife and is 
always available and willing and able to care for minor 
child in the absence of the Plaintiff. 
In contrast, the Defendant, the natural mother, re-
sided in a two bedroom apartment without any special 
accommodations for the minor child (R-63 thru R-65). 
The Defendant shared the apartment with a roommate 
on the third floor of the apartment complex and the De-
fendant would utilize the living room couch as her sleep-
ing quarters during the visitation by the minor child al-
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though the Defendant characterizes the second bedroom 
as "his bedroom" (R-65). It is obvious that the accom-
modations which she provided for the minor child were 
physically inadequate and that in fact the minor child 
did not have "a separate bedroom of his own" but was 
compelled to share all of the living quarters with the other 
two occupants. In the absence of the Defendant the child 
is shuffled between the commercial nursery, a maternal 
great grandmother and the step-mother of the Defendant. 
The step-mother would obviously be more capable, physic-
ally to care for a minor child of two years except for the 
fact that she had six minor children of her own and had 
an infant less than one year old and could not accommo-
date still another. The maternal great grandmother Mrs. 
Hancock, was the principal baby sitter when the child 
was not in a commercial nursery. She testified that she 
was competent to care for a child two years old and had 
no apparent handicaps or nervous conditions which might 
tend to detract for her capacity as a baby sitter of two 
year old boy. Notwithstanding this fact, however, she 
admits that she has had constant headaches for years 
and that she has taken pain pills, tranquilizers, and bar-
biturates for her headaches and has taken pain killers 
for her headaches. She further confirms that her head-
aches have persisted for over 30 years and that she goes 
to a doctor all the time (R-69 thru R-71). 
The Defendant admits to the use of narcotics some 
four years ago. The person whom the Defendant indi-
cated she intended to marry also utilizes narcotics and 
the Defendant's roommate utilizes narcotics. Although 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
there is no testimony in the trial that the Defendant used 
narcotics or drugs after the incident to which she testified 
the testimony was clear that she permitted the use of 
narcotics by her roommate and by her fiance in the pres-
ence of the minor child. 
The Defendant's total efforts in obtaining custody 
of the minor child was shrouded by deception and began 
as early as the hearing in Selma, Alabama where she 
convinced her step-mother that a letter was needed from 
the family Bishop to prevent the child from being placed 
in a foster home when in fact such was not the case. She 
accused the Plaintiff of psychiatric abnormalities in Ala-
bama only to have the Plaintiff found normal by psychia-
trists in Alabama. She again accused the Plaintiff of the 
same psychiatric abnormalities prior to and during the 
trial in Salt Lake City. Yet when Plaintiff attempted to 
obtain an evaluation of both parties and the environment 
in which the child was proposed to be raised, the Defen-
dant objected to Plaintiff's motion for such an evaluation. 
Although the factual circumstances are distinguish-
able, it is analogous to Gerard vs. Young, 20 U. 2d 30, 432 
P. 2d 343, where the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a 
person may not rely on the Fifth Amendment in civil 
cases to frustrate an action and prevent the other due 
process of the law. In so holding, the Court, citing Wig-
more and Am. Jur. stated: 
"The constitutional provision may not be set 
aside, but the only purpose was to make the State 
convict an accused person by evidence other than 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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admissions of the Defendant himself. It was not 
intended to allow a party in a civil action to es-
cape civil liability by claiming the privilege. He 
need not incriminate himself, but he has no con-
stitutional assurance that the jury must seal up 
their minds to the only reasonable inference 
which could be drawn from his failure to give 
evidence that would throw light upon the matter 
before the court." (Emphasis added.) 
Citing McCormick on Evidence, page 163, section 80, 
the court states: 
"Under familiar principles an unfavorable 
inference may be made against a party not only 
for destroying evidence, but for the mere failure 
to produce witnesses or documents within his 
control. No showing of wrong or fraud seems to 
be required as a foundation for the inference that 
the evidence if produced would have been un-
favorable. Why should not this same conclusion 
be drawn from the party's active interposing of 
a privilege to keep evidence out?" 
The Court also cites Phillips vs. Case, 201 Mass. 444, 
87 N. E. 755: 
"It is a rule of law that the objection of a 
party to evidence as incompetent and immaterial, 
and insistent upon his right have his case tried 
according to law, cannot be made a subject of 
comment in the argument. On the other hand, 
if evidence is material and competent except for 
a personal privilege of one of the parties to have 
it excluded under the law, his claim of the privi-
lege may be referred to in argument and con-
sidered by the jury, as indicating his opinion 
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that the evidence, if received, would be prejudi-
cial to him . . . ". 
As earlier stated, the facts on all of the above cita-
tions differ from the facts of the case at bar. However, 
all of the circumstances are analogous, namely; a party 
in civil action cannot frustrate due process of law by 
claiming the privilege of the Fifth Amendment. At least, 
the evidence withheld under such claim is to be presumed 
unfavorable. 
If we can safely assume that a pre-hearing evaluation 
would have provided information regarding accommoda-
tions made by Defendant for the minor child, information 
on Defendant's mental and emotional qualifications to 
care for a minor son, information regarding the use of 
narcotics or drugs, information regarding Defendant's 
fiance, roommate, grandmother, step-mother and all other 
pertinent information, we should be able to assume from 
Defendant's claim of privilege from consenting to the 
evaluation that the evidence would have been unfavorable 
or at least a substantial and material portion of the evi-
dence would have been unfavorable. 
A comprehensive article on custody matters was 
printed in the Marquette Law Review, Vol. 56, Fall 1972, 
page 51, No. 1. The article cites the proposed Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act, which was drafted by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, August, 1970. 
The article points out the various factors which the 
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courts have based custody decisions on and Lewis vs. 
Lewis, 252 Wis. 576, 32 N. W. 2d 227 (1948) is particu-
larly in point. The authors of the article, members of the 
Wisconsin Bar Association and the Wisconsin Judiciary 
state: 
"In Lewis vs. Lewis, the court approved find-
ing that the wife was unfit because of illicit re-
lationship, which started while her husband was 
in the Armed Forces and continued after his re-
turn, showed so great a disregard or proprieties 
as to warrant awarding custody to the husband. 
The wife's unwillingness to give up her improper 
association and consider conventionalities re-
quired awarding custody to the husband." (Pg. 
64.) 
In the case at bar, the record is practically devoid of 
any material evidence which could reasonably lead the 
court to hold that the Defendant has met the test of show-
ing that her conduct, her emotional and physical qualifi-
cations, her financial circumstances and the environment 
in which she proposes to place the minor child in question, 
are all in the best interest of the child. 
There is ample evidence, on the other hand, to prove 
that the best interest of the child is served by awarding 
the custody of the minor son to the Plaintiff. In addition 
to the benefits earlier referred to, the testimony of the 
psychiatrist indicates that, although brief, the one visit 
of the Plaintiff and his minor son gave the psychiatrist 
a stress situation where the psychiatrist could observe 
the interaction between father and son. The doctor's tes-
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timony, probably the most important of all the testimony 
before the court, is quoted in part below: 
"Well, my evaluation of both father and 
child was to include a normal . . . include a men-
tal status examination, see how they functioned 
in terms of their emotional status describing their 
behavior, attitude, thinking and feelings, how 
they responded intellectually to questions and 
so forth and I did perceive them both on that 
basis" (R-146, 147). 
". . . Mr. Mark is an above average young 
man who is a very physical individual who has 
in spite of a rather strong physical interest begun 
to explore the intellectual foundation for child 
rearing and has begun to derive a philosophy as 
to how he might best interact with the child 
that he is able to use the resources about him in 
terms of influencing him for appropriate child 
rearing and as in the illustration that I gave, he 
was able to deal with an appropriate behavior" 
(R-147, 148). 
"He was able to deal with negative feelings. 
He was consistent. He was compassionate. He 
was firm I would have to say in dealing with the 
child's distress. In setting limits he did quite 
well and that he had good judgment and he is 
an intelligent young man" (R-148). 
"As the child became distressed and upset 
this would be an opportunity to see how a parent 
deals with an upset child and Mr. Mark was com-
passionate, was understanding of his situation, 
described what was going on to me, how he felt 
about it, what he perceived the child to be, what 
his distresses were and he dealt with him firmly 
but quite fairly and appropriately and did not 
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become unduly distressed even though it would 
be impossible . . . it would be possible to distress 
a person" (R-145, 146). 
The evidence before the Court does not justify find-
ing that the best interest of the minor child is served by 
awarding his custody to the Defendant mother and does 
support a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE 
EVIDENCE PROFFERED. 
On May 3, 1974 the Plaintiff moved the Court for 
a rehearing based on newly discovered evidence which 
the Plaintiff could not have discovered on the date of the 
trial. The motion for rehearing was heard on the 10th 
day of May 1974 and attorney for the Plaintiff and attor-
ney for the Defendant appeared before the Court. The 
Court was without a reporter. 
The Plaintiff proffered evidence to the Court regard-
ing the arrest of the Defendant Tamra Mark, on the 28th 
day of April 1974 at 7:00 A.M. for unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance and indicated that the counsel 
for the Plaintiff had in his possession a copy of the book-
ing sheet regarding the arrest. Counsel for Plaintiff fur-
ther proffered evidence which would tend to show that 
Defendant's fiance Michael Nuzzolo, Defendant's room-
mate and Defendant's roommate's boy friend were also 
arrested together with the Defendant on the west side 
of South Salt Lake. 
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The Court indicated that even if the Plaintiff were 
able to prove the proffered evidence the Court would not 
be inclined to change its ruling regarding the custody of 
the minor child in question and therefore denied Plain-
tiff's motion for rehearing. 
The Plaintiff concedes that generally, motions for 
new trials are viewed with disfavor and a ruling of a trial 
court will not be overturned unless there is a showing of 
an abuse of the discretion of the trial court. Jones Mfg. 
Co. vs. Wilson, 15 U. 2d 210, 390 P. 2d 127. The cases 
generally held that a motion for new trial would be 
granted if the party moving for the new trial shows that 
the evidence was discovered since the trial, that the evi-
dence could not be discovered before trial with due dili-
gence, that the evidence is material, that the evidence is 
not merely cumulative or impeaching and that the ad-
mission of such evidence in a new trial would probably 
bring about a different result. Universal Inv. Co. vs. Car-
pets, 16 U. 2d 336, 400 P. 2d 564. VanDyke vs. Ogden 
Savings Bank, 48 U. 606, 161 P. 50, the Court, referring 
to 3 Graham and Waterman on New Trials the Court 
stated: 
"The rule that newly discovered evidence 
must not be cumulative, though well settled, has 
an occasional exception. Where, by admitting it, 
what was before mysterious and doubtful be-
comes plain and certain, so that if received, the 
most obvious justice, and, if rejected, the most 
palpable injustice will be done, courts do not 
hesitate to adopt the former alternative." 
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In the case at bar the Defendant's character, emo-
tional and mental stability and propriety as well as the 
Plaintiff's is of great concern to the Court because of the 
welfare of the minor child in question. At trial some evi-
dence was introduced which tended to show that the 
Defendant, natural mother of the minor child, used nar-
cotics in the past and permitted the use of narcotics in 
the presence of the minor child. This testimony, however, 
was denied far the most part by the Defendant or by her 
fiance who testified at trial. The newly discovered evi-
dence goes to the heart of the Defendant's qualification 
as a mother and as a person having legal custody of the 
minor child, especially in view of the fact that the child 
shared living facilities with the persons who, according 
to the Plaintiff's proffered evidence, were arrested for 
illegal possession of a controlled substance. 
The proffered evidence, if proved, impeaches the 
Defendant and her fiance since the Defendant testified 
that except for some four years past she had not used 
any drugs or narcotics and the Defendant's fiance testi-
fied that he had never seen the Defendant use any nar-
cotics or drugs. The proffered evidence, if proved, would 
also shed light on the Defendant's moral character since 
it would show that the Defendant and her companions 
were booked at 7:00 A.M. the morning before the trial 
at an address other than at her residence. If the Defen-
dant was in fact booked at the early hour of 7:00 A.M. 
it could be reasonably assumed that the actual time of 
arrest would be at least an hour prior to the actual book-
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ing which could reasonably lead to the presumption that 
the Defendant and her fiance and the Defendant's room-
mate and her roommate's boy friend spent the night to-
gether at the address where the Defendant was arrested 
in South Salt Lake. 
The proffered evidence, if proved, would make abso-
lutely clear the Defendant's disregard for the welfare of 
the minor child and for the oath which she took in court 
prior to her testimony. 
The newly discovered evidence which was proffered 
by the Plaintiff together with the evidence before the 
Court would clearly show that the best interest of the 
child would not be served by awarding his custody to the 
Defendant mother but rather to the Plaintiff fattier and 
and the Court erred in refusing to grant Plaintiff's motion 
for new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that the judgment of the lower 
Court should be reversed and judgment entered in favor 
of the Plaintiff or in the alternative a new trial should 
be granted on the following basis: 
1. The Court erred in refusing to grant the Plain-
tiff's motion to compel the Defendant to submit to a child 
custody evaluation notwithstanding the fact that written 
report could not have been introduced into evidence since 
the Court had authority to order such an evaluation and 
to receive a written evaluation of the prospects and prog-
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nosis without receiving specific facts or without violating 
confidential disclosures. (Emphasis added.) 
2. The Court erred in granting judgment for the 
Defendant since the only affirmative evidence before the 
Court is evidence in favor of the Plaintiff and the De-
fendant submitted no independent affirmative evidence 
to show that the best interest of the child would be better 
served by awarding the custody of said child to the De-
fendant and because the Court appeared to have pro-
ceeded on the theory that the Plaintiff had the burden 
of proving Defendant unfit, immoral, or incompetent be-
fore the presumption in favor of the mother could be over-
turned. 
3. The Court erred in refusing to grant Plaintiff's 
motion for rehearing because the proffered evidence, if 
proved, would clearly indicate that the Defendant and 
her fiance utilized narcotics and drugs and that the child 
would be placed in a surrounding where such activities 
were permitted in his presence and would have rebutted 
any inference that the child's best interest and welfare 
would be served by placing the child in the custody of the 
Defendant mother. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KENNETH M. HISATAKE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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